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I. Introduction 
A. Modern Use of Private Military Firms in Combat Zones by the 
United States 
The United States has relied on Private Military Firms 
(PMFs) extensively to carry out its numerous overseas military 
missions since the end of the Cold War.1 Civilians and contractors 
have always had a place in American wars, even during the 
American Revolution and beyond.2 But the recent American 
                                                                                                     
 1. See discussion infra Part I. 
 2. See David Isenberg, The Founding Contractors, CATO INST. (July 7, 
2008), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/founding-contractors (last 
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incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq brought an unprecedented 
number of private contractors into the forefront of these conflict 
zones, the discussions surrounding them, and the legal questions 
arising from their ashes.3 Particularly, private contractors in Iraq 
seemed to be operating in a legal grey area—they clearly were not 
soldiers, and they clearly were not civilians; one question loomed 
over every incident involving a private contractor who 
accompanied U.S. soldiers: Who has jurisdiction over them and 
pursuant to which laws?4  
In 2000, Congress seemed to solve this conundrum when it 
enacted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.5 Federal 
prosecutors successfully used it multiple times to convict civilians 
and private contractors for their crimes committed abroad, 
although these convictions are hardly the norm.6 But the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit threw a wrench in the 
wheels of justice in the summer of 2017. The D.C. Circuit ruled in 
United States v. Slatten7 that “the application of Section 924(c)”—
                                                                                                     
visited Nov. 4, 2018, 10:50 am) (discussing how private contractors were integral 
in winning the American Revolution) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice); id. (“Private contractors are as American as 
apple pie. In fact, without private contractors there would not have been an 
America. Or, to paraphrase Genesis: In the beginning, God created private 
contractors.”). 
 3. See discussion infra Part I. 
 4. See Stephen P. Cullen, Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter and 
Address Criminal Acts Committed by Contractor Employees Accompanying 
Armed Forces Overseas, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 509, 511 (2009) (“As so many 
contractor employees accompany U.S. armed forces in overseas operations, it is 
inevitable that some contractor employees will commit crimes. An effective 
system to deter and address crimes committed by contractor employees is notably 
absent from current military operations. The gap created by this absence is 
serious.”). 
 5. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 
[hereinafter MEJA] (establishing jurisdiction to prosecute certain civilians 
abroad when they commit a felony crime). 
 6. See U.S. v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that Arnt 
was properly indicted under MEJA for fatally stabbing her husband, Staff 
Sergeant Matthias Arnt, III, while on Incirlik Air Base, Turkey); see also 
CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ: 
TRANSFORMING MILITARY LOGISTICS 137 (2009) (discussing MEJA’s application on 
two contractors: Aaron Langston who assaulted a fellow contractor with a knife 
in Iraq and a U.S. contractor who worked at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility who 
had child pornography on his computer).  
 7. See United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. 
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and its accompanying thirty-year mandatory minimum 
sentences—to three of the defendants, ex-Blackwater contractors 
responsible for the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad, Iraq:  
[I]s cruel and unusual punishment. The sentences are cruel in 
that they impose a 30-year sentence based on the fact that 
private security contractors in a war zone were armed with 
government-issued automatic rifles and explosives. They are 
unusual because they apply Section 924(c) in a manner it has 
never been applied before to a situation which Congress never 
contemplated.8 
This sentence was the result of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) which makes it a felony to use an automatic weapon to 
further a violent crime and—in the case of the defendants—
mandated a minimum sentence of thirty years imprisonment.9  
This Note argues that this appellate court decision throws 
MEJA into jeopardy as a workable method with which to gain 
jurisdiction over private contractors employed in U.S. conflicts 
                                                                                                     
denied sub nom., Slough v. United States, 218 U.S. LEXIS 2836 (U.S., May 2018) 
(holding that mandatory minimum sentence requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
violates the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment when applied to contractors who are working overseas in military 
conflicts in support of U.S. government operations). In Slatten, the D.C. Circuit 
Court considered whether three defendants’ thirty-year mandatory minimum 
sentences under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 811. These three defendants were 
found guilty of various counts including voluntary manslaughter and the use of 
machine guns in the commission of a violent crime under 924(c). Id. These 
defendants were found guilty of killing 17 Iraqi civilians and injuring others in 
the 2007 Nisour Square Shooting in Baghdad, Iraq. Id. at 777–78. The issue with 
their sentences was the fact that these three defendants were working in Iraq as 
private security contractors in support of the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense. Id. The Court reasoned that because 924(c) was meant to 
combat the deadly combination of drug crimes and violent crimes in the United 
States, 924(c) was improperly applied to the defendants. Id. at 812. The Court 
held that 924(c)’s mandatory minimum sentences as applied to private 
contractors performing their duties in a warzone violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 820. 
 8. Id. at 820. There are several different ways in which “Nisour” is spelled, 
including “Nisur” and “Nisoor.” Several of these variations occur throughout this 
Note depending on the citation, although the “Nisour” spelling is most prevalent 
in media and is the most used spelling in this Note.  
 9. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(B)(ii) (2006) (“If the firearm possessed by a person 
convicted of a violation of this subsection is a machinegun or a destructive device, 
or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.”).  
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abroad.10 This Note argues that the language in MEJA is too broad 
and too easily invites federal prosecutors to charge defendants 
with crimes that carry sentences that will likely be ruled to violate 
the Eighth Amendment just as they were in United States v. 
Slatten.11 This Note offers suggestions for how Congress might 
address this problem, amend MEJA, and give federal prosecutors 
a concrete tool with which to prosecute private contractors who 
violate the laws and norms of both the U.S. and the international 
community.12  
The use of PMFs around the world has increased dramatically 
over the past decade as there has been a “surge of PMF activity 
around the globe.”13 Initially comprising of just a few primary 
actors—often owned by a single parent company or investment 
firm—the market for PMFs today has transformed into a 
billion-dollar industry comprising of several hundred PMFs who 
provide a wide range of services. Blackwater USA alone earned 
over two billion dollars providing services for the U.S. government 
before it changed ownership and its name.14 As the industry stands 
today:  
                                                                                                     
 10. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV; see also Slatten, 865 F.3d at 820 (holding 
that mandatory minimum sentence requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violates the 
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment when 
applied to contractors who are working overseas in military conflicts in support 
of U.S. government operations).  
 12. See discussion infra Part V. 
 13. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the 
Private Military Industry, 26 INT’L SECURITY 1, 3 (2002). 
 14. Beyond Blackwater: An Industry Reinvents Itself After the Demise of Its 
Most Controversial Firm, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21590370-industry-reinvents-itself-
after-demise-its-most-controversial-firm-beyond-blackwater (last visited Nov. 4, 
2018, 10:52 am) (“Blackwater . . . rose to worldwide prominence as an outsourced 
branch of the American army during the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan . . . . 
It earn[ed] a total of around $2 billion from Uncle Sam for providing armed 
personnel to the Pentagon, the State Department and, secretly, the CIA.”) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Erik Prince, 
the founder of Blackwater, sold Blackwater (now Academi) and is currently the 
chairman of the Frontier Services Group, “a logistics company focused on Africa 
and South Asia.” Erik Prince, U.S. Forces Should Acquire Material and Hire 
Manpower Support: Opposing View, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2017, 7:02 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/08/07/erik-prince-restructure-
afghanistan-war-editorials-debates/104389448/ (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Erik Prince recently—and 
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PMFs represent the newest addition to the modern battlefield, 
and their role in contemporary warfare is becoming increasingly 
significant. Not since the eighteenth century has there been 
such reliance on private soldiers to accomplish tasks directly 
affecting the tactical and strategic success of engagement. With 
the continued growth and increasing activity of the privatized 
military industry, the start of the twenty-first century is 
witnessing the gradual breakdown of the Weberian monopoly 
over the forms of violence. PMFs may well portend the new 
business face of war.15  
This modern incarnation of the PMF industry originated at 
the end of the Cold War, but it was the U.S. occupation of Iraq that 
transformed the industry into one that continues to grow 
exponentially—currently, there are nearly 200 active PMFs.16 The 
U.S. used more private contractors than soldiers at certain times 
in this unique conflict, where these contractors were “employed by 
companies that have entered into contracts with the DoD 
[Department of Defense], the Department of State, and other U.S. 
government agencies operating in conflict zones. There are at least 
as many of them as there are uniformed soldiers: More than 
225,000 by mid-2009.”17 
On the surface, none of this is surprising given that the 
military is just one more area of government which privatized more 
of its defense functions as Cold War tensions faded in the late 
                                                                                                     
controversially—argued that the U.S. should “restructure” the war in 
Afghanistan “similar to a bankruptcy reorganization.” Id. He argues that this can 
be accomplished by imbedding private contractors into the Afghan army, giving 
the U.S. an exit strategy. Id. He claims this can be done for twenty percent of the 
forty-eight billion dollars spent in Afghanistan this year. Id. It should be noted 
that Prince is the brother of Betsy DeVos, the U.S. Secretary of Education and 
fellow billionaire, and is contemplating a Congressional bid in Wyoming as a 
Republican. Jeremy W. Peters, Maggie Haberman & Glenn Thrush, Erik Prince, 
Blackwater Founder, Weighs Primary Challenge to Wyoming Republican, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/us/politics/erik-prince-
blackwater-wyoming-senate.html?_r=0 (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 15. Singer, supra note 13, at 2. 
 16. See DAVID ISENBERG, SHADOW FORCE: PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN 
IRAQ 7 (2009) (describing the “at least 200 foreign and domestic private security 
companies in Iraq, ranging from major firms such as Aegis Defense Services, 
ArmorGroup, Blackwater USA Group, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy to far smaller 
ones”). 
 17. LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR & PEACE 2–3 (2011). 
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1980s and early 1990s.18 Under President Bill Clinton, 
privatization accelerated across all government sectors, including 
the foreign policy sector.19 
What is new, however, is just how dependent the U.S. has 
become on the PMF industry to wage any credible intervention 
overseas, “creat[ing] a dependency syndrome on the private 
marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but 
shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction.”20 
Despite the fact that the use of PMFs in Iraq actually harmed the 
U.S. counterinsurgency effort, “when it comes to private military 
contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into 
a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without 
them.”21 Peter W. Singer, who is highly regarded generally as an 
expert in security studies and is an exceptional authority 
specifically regarding the PMF industry, explained that:  
When the history books are written about the Iraq war, 
they will point to several critical turning points in U.S. efforts 
to beat back the insurgency that flourished after the 2003 
invasion and “Mission Accomplished” victory speeches were the 
order of the day. Certain to make the list are the battle for 
Fallujah, the revelation of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and 
now the shootout in Baghdad that left as many as 20 civilians 
dead, the entire country seething and U.S. operations at a 
standstill. What will distinguish these accounts from histories 
of past wars is the new common denominator for each of these 
incidents: [T]he private military industry.22 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. at 30 (discussing the “privatization revolution” that took place 
during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush in an effort to 
trim waste from “fattened government bureaucracies” and save taxpayer money 
on the domestic sphere). 
 19. See id. at 31 (“Caught between escalating price tags for weapons systems 
and political pressure to cut costs in the post-Cold War era without weakening 
the military’s capabilities, [Department of Defense] Secretary [William] Cohen 
turned to the private sector for advice . . . .”). 
 20. Peter W. Singer, Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em: Private 
Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency, BROOKINGS (Sept. 27, 2007), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/cant-win-with-em-cant-go-to-war-without-em-
private-military-contractors-and-counterinsurgency/ (last visited Nov. 4 10:54 am) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Peter W. Singer, The Dark Truth About Blackwater, BROOKINGS (Oct. 2, 
2007), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-dark-truth-about-blackwater (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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Fanning the flames of the fledgling debate over the increased 
privatization of the military is the fact that this massive reliance 
on PMFs in Iraq failed to end the initial occupation on schedule, 
created more burdens for the military and policy-makers, and 
alienated the local civilian population, creating more problems for 
the U.S. than solving, and tarnishing the reputation of the U.S. 
military in the Middle East beyond repair.23 
B. Nisour Square Massacre Leads to United States v. Slatten 
One of the most prominent cases involving PMFs in Iraq 
revolves around the 2014 sentencing of four ex-Blackwater 
contractors to prison terms for their roles in the September 16, 
2007 Nisour massacre which left fourteen Iraqi civilians dead and 
seventeen injured.24 In this rare instance, the U.S. government 
was able to successfully gain jurisdiction over the contactors and 
earn convictions for the defendants. The U.S. government had 
jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to MEJA.25 Nicholas 
Slatten, 30, of Sparta Tennessee, was sentenced to life in prison for 
first-degree murder for firing the first shots.26 Paul Alvin Slough, 
35, of Keller Texas, Evan Shawn Liberty, 32, of Rochester, New 
Hampshire, and Dustin Laurent Heard 33, of Maryville, 
Tennessee, were all sentenced “to the mandatory term of 
imprisonment for of thirty years for their convictions under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), plus one day on all of the remaining counts.”27 
These counts included dozens of counts of attempted 
manslaughter, up to 13 counts of voluntary manslaughter, and a 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. 
 24. See generally United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see 
also generally Wesley Bruer & Michael Pearson, Ex-Blackwater Contractors 
Sentenced in Nusoor Square Shooting in Iraq, CNN (Apr. 14, 2015 8:41 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/13/us/blackwater-contractors-iraq-
sentencing/index.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 25. See Slatten, 865 F.3d at 777 (ruling that the Court had proper 
jurisdiction under MEJA). 
 26. Id. at 776–78. 
 27. Id. 
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single charge of a firearms offense for each defendant.28 
Subsequently,  
Slough was found guilty of 13 counts of voluntary 
manslaughter, 17 counts of attempted manslaughter, and one 
firearms offense. Liberty was found guilty of eight counts of 
voluntary manslaughter, 12 counts of attempted manslaughter, 
and one firearms offense. Heard was found guilty of six counts 
of voluntary manslaughter, 11 counts of attempted 
manslaughter, and one firearms offense.29 
While these sentences seemed extreme to those who were 
sympathetic towards the defendants, they signaled to the people of 
Iraq that the U.S. would seek justice and punish those who 
perpetrated atrocities in Iraq during the war and occupation, 
regardless of how long it may take.30 The controversy surrounding 
this case resulted from the mandatory minimum sentences given 
to Slough, Liberty, and Heard under Section 924(c), which 
mandates: 
924(c) (1) (A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum 
sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any 
other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation 
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an 
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or 
dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be 
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a 
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a 
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime— 
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 
years; 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Office of Public Affairs, Four Former Blackwater Employees Found 
Guilty of Charges in Fatal Nisur Square Shooting in Iraq, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 22, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-former-blackwater-employees-found-
guilty-charges-fatal-nisur-square-shooting-iraq (discussing the charges brought 
against the defendants and the guilty verdicts that were found for most of the 
charges) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. (“‘This verdict is a resounding affirmation of the commitment of 
the American people to the rule of law, even in times of war,’ said U.S. Attorney 
[for the District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen Jr.]”). 
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(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and 
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation 
of this subsection-- 
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or 
semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or 
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with 
a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.31 
The language of 924(c) is clear, demanding, and, at first glance, 
poses no real question regarding its application to this case.  
C. Background of the 2007 Nisour Square Massacre 
On the morning of September 16, 2007, Blackwater security 
guards were escorting an American envoy in Baghdad, Iraq when 
a car bomb exploded near the U.S. diplomat.32 The four 
defendants—Slatten, Slough, Liberty, and Heard—were members 
of team Raven 23 which was “sent to provide secondary support in 
the effort to evacuate the diplomat.”33 A similar car bomb had 
previously exploded in Nisour Square that same year “in response 
to which Iraqi security had been dramatically increased, with 
multiple checkpoints [stationed] at the Square’s entrances [to 
protect against] potential threats.”34 Instead of directing Raven 23 
to meet with the primary team at a pre-arranged checkpoint, “shift 
leader Jimmy Watson ignored his orders and directed his team to 
                                                                                                     
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (emphasis added). 
 32. See Slatten, 865 F.3d at 777 (“On September 16, 2007, a car bomb 
exploded in Baghdad near a United States diplomat who was under the protection 
of Blackwater, a private security firm under contract with the State 
Department.”). See generally Blackwater Incident: What Happened, BBC (Dec. 8, 
2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7033332.stm (telling the story of what happened 
on September 16, 2007) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 33. Slatten, 865 F.3d at 777.  
 34. Id.  
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Nisur Square, a traffic circle in downtown Baghdad that Watson 
intended to ‘lock down.’”35 
The Raven 23 convoy consisted of four armored vehicles and, 
with the assistance of with Iraqi police, stopped at the south end 
of the square and “brought all traffic to a halt.”36 Almost as soon as 
Raven 23 arrived and locked down traffic the chaos that would be 
known as the Nisour Square Massacre unfolded: 
Two or three minutes later, witnesses heard the "pops" of shots 
being fired, and a woman screaming for her son. The car that 
had been hit, a white Kia sedan, had been flagged days earlier 
by a Blackwater intelligence analyst as a type that might be 
used as a car bomb. According to the government, the Kia then 
rolled forward and lightly bumped the vehicle in front of it. The 
driver’s side of the Kia windshield had a hole in it and was 
splattered with blood.37 
Two Iraqi police officers readily observed that the driver of the Kia 
had a bullet dead-center in the middle of his forehead.38 Despite 
the attempts of both Iraqi police officers to cease Raven 23 from 
firing on the Kia further,39 the onslaught escalated. As the Kia 
rolled forward with its driver immobilized,40 “heavy gunfire 
erupted from the Raven 23 convoy into the Kia,”41 forcing the Iraqi 
police to scramble for cover.42 At this time, “[m]ultiple grenades 
were fired at the Kia, causing it to catch fire”43 while the “Kia 
passenger was shot and killed.”44 
                                                                                                     
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. See id. (“Two nearby Iraqi police officers approached the Kia on either 
side, and they saw the driver’s face full of blood, with a bullet wound in the middle 
of his forehead.”).  
 39. See id. (“One [Iraqi police officer] turned back to the convoy, waving his 
hands to indicate the shooting should stop, while the other made similar gestures 
as he tried to open the driver’s door.”). 
 40. See id. at 777–78 (“At that point, the vehicle in front of the Kia moved 
away, causing the Kia to roll forward again.”). 
 41. Id. at 778.  
 42. See id. (describing how “the Iraqi officers took cover behind their nearby 
kiosk”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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 Unfortunately, the carnage was far from over. According the 
court records,  
Indiscriminate shooting from the convoy then continued past 
the Kia, to the south of the Square. Victims were hit as they 
sought cover or tried to escape, giving rise to the bulk of 
casualties that day. At some point a Raven 23 member radioed 
that they were taking incoming fire, but others could not locate 
any such threat. When the shooting died down, a radio call 
indicated one of the Raven 23 vehicles had been disabled and 
needed to be hooked up to another vehicle to be towed. During 
the hook-up, a member of the Raven 23 convoy saw an Iraqi shot 
in the stomach while his hands were up, by an unidentified 
Blackwater guard who had exited his vehicle. Once the hook-up 
was complete, the Raven 23 convoy began moving slowly around 
the circle and north out of the Square, where isolated shootings 
continued both to the west and north. By the time the convoy 
finally exited the Square, at least thirty-one Iraqi civilians had 
been killed or wounded.45 
Additionally, according to a U.S. embassy “spot report,”46 one of the 
Blackwater teams that had originally escorted the U.S. official 
back to the Green Zone was re-dispatched to assist Raven 23 in 
Nisour Square.47 This further compounded the day’s tensions as 
“[t]he re-deployed unit found itself stuck at an intersection in 
Nisoor Square and was confronted by Iraqi police and army” after 
which “[a] U.S. forces quick reaction team was sent to help rescue 
the unit.”48 All this set the stage for the trial of Slatten, Slough, 
Liberty, and Heard who were ultimately prosecuted, convicted, 
and sentenced under MEJA for carrying out this mayhem.49 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id.  
 46. See Blackwater Incident, supra note 32 (“One of the most detailed 
accounts of the events according to Blackwater employees comes from an initial 
report by the US embassy. This was seen by the Washington Post at the end of 
September 2007. It was described as a ‘spot report’ and not intended to be 
authoritative.”). 
 47. See id. (“According to those accounts . . . [o]ne of the Blackwater teams 
that had transported the official back to the Green Zone was re-dispatched to help 
out in Nisoor Square.”). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See generally MEJA, supra note 5. 
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II. The United States Has Trouble Gaining Jurisdiction over 
Civilians Overseas 
The abundant use of private contractors overseas by the 
United States government is another example of the law failing to 
adapt to modern times, similar to the legal perplexities that plague 
the attempt to consistently regulate the use of innovative 
technology.50 Throughout the past few decades as the Supreme 
Court has slowly recognized that civilians abroad cannot be 
prosecuted pursuant to the same jurisdictional laws as military 
servicemembers, Congress has failed to create a reliable 
replacement jurisdictional framework with which to prosecute 
civilians abroad whose activities render them seemingly 
synonymous with their military counterparts.51  
A. Kinsella v. United States 
In Kinsella v. United States,52 the Supreme Court held that 
civilians who committed a non-capital offense could not be tried via 
                                                                                                     
 50. See, e.g., Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017) (highlighting the issues in regulating 
peer-to-peer ride-sharing). 
Today, regulators in New York City and many other places in the U.S. 
and around the world are struggling to recast taxi regulation, given the 
ways that Uber and other taxi apps have fundamentally transformed 
the market for "point-to-point" transportation. U.S. regulators to date 
have not been nearly as innovative in their responses to the emergence 
of the taxi apps as the apps have been in changing the taxi business.  
Id. 
 51. See discussion infra Part II.  
 52. See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (holding that the 
prosecution of civilians by court-martial was unconstitutional for lack of 
jurisdiction because civilians are not under the authority of Congress to regulate 
the military and because courts-martial fail to uphold the Article III protection of 
civilians, as well as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Kinsella grappled with the 
validity of the court-martial of civilian persons during peacetime who 
accompanied the armed forces outside of the United States and were charged 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) with noncapital offenses. 
Id. at 235. Joanna S. Dial was the wife of a U.S. soldier and the two of them lived 
in government housing at Baumholder, Germany with their three children. Id. 
Both the husband and wife were charged with the unpremeditated murder of one 
of their children under Article 118(2) of the UCMJ. Id. at 235–36. Both of them 
pleaded guilty and were sentenced to the maximum penalty permitted. Id. at 236. 
Because the Court had previously held that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
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court-martial, as a court-martial deprives non-military civilians of 
their Constitutional rights under Article III and as guaranteed 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.53 In this case, Mrs. 
Joanna S. Dial was living in Germany with her family.54 Her 
husband was a U.S. soldier stationed in Germany.55 When one of 
their children died, both Mrs. Dial and her husband were 
eventually charged under Article 118 (2) of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.56 They both pleaded guilty in exchange for lesser 
offenses57 and, after Mrs. Dial’s jurisdictional challenge was denied 
by the court,58 they both received the maximum sentences 
possible.59 After a successful petition of habeas corpus, Mrs. Dial 
was released by the district court,60 which resulted in subsequent 
appeals by the warden of the Federal Reformatory for Women at 
                                                                                                     
could not be expanded to prosecute civilian dependents under Clause 14 for 
capital crimes, it was illogical to allow the expansion of Clause 14 to prosecute 
them for noncapital crimes. Id. at 248. Therefore, the Court held that Mrs. Dial 
could not be prosecuted and convicted by court-martial because of the protections 
provided by Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 249.  
 53. Id. at 249 (“We therefore hold that Mrs. Dial is protected by the specific 
provisions of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and that her 
prosecution and conviction by court-martial are not constitutionally 
permissible.”). 
 54. See id. at 235 (discussing the relevant facts of the case, such as the 
family’s residential situation on the military base). 
 55. See id. (“The appellee is the mother of Mrs. Joanna S. Dial, the wife of a 
soldier who was assigned to a tank battalion of the United States Army. The Dials 
and their three children lived in government housing quarters at Baumholder, 
Germany.”). 
 56. See id. at 235–36 (“In consequence of the death of one of their children, 
both of the Dials were charged with unpremeditated murder, under Article 118 
(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”). 
 57. See id. at 236 (“Upon the Dials’ offer to plead guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter under Article 119 of the Code, both charges were withdrawn and 
new ones charging them separately with the lesser offense were returned. They 
were then tried together before a general court-martial at Baumholder.”).  
 58. See id. (“Mrs. Dial challenged the jurisdiction of the court-martial over 
her but, upon denial of her motion, pleaded guilty, as did her husband.”). 
 59. See id. (discussing how “[e]ach was sentenced to the maximum penalty 
permitted under the Code”). 
 60. See id. at 235–36 (“Their convictions were upheld by the Court of Military 
Appeals, and Mrs. Dial was returned to the United States and placed in the 
Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West Virginia. Thereafter the 
appellee filed this petition for habeas corpus and obtained Mrs. Dial’s discharge 
from custody.”). 
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Alderson, West Virginia where Mrs. Dial was previously held.61 
The Supreme Court held that the UCMJ did not have jurisdiction 
over civilians for noncapital offenses, even when charged with 
crimes committed on military bases overseas.62 This case was one 
of the last major cases which slowly but surely precluded trying 
civilians by court-martial. 
B. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc. 
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc. 63 is a case that 
is somewhat relevant to the general jurisdictional topic of this Note 
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. (“From this judgment the warden has appealed.”). 
 62. See id. at 248 (“We are therefore constrained to say that since this Court 
has said that the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot expand Clause 14 so as to 
include prosecution of civilian dependents for capital crimes, it cannot expand 
Clause 14 to include prosecution of them for noncapital offenses.”); see also Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75–78 (1957) (holding that civilian respondents, who had 
been convicted by court-martial for murdering their soldier husbands overseas 
and sentenced to life imprisonment, could not be tried under the UCMJ for capital 
offenses for this violated their Constitutional rights under Article III and the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 
13, 23 (1955) (holding that an ex-service member could not be tried by 
court-martial for a crime he committed after he left military service and was 
officially a civilian); id. at 22 (“[t]here are dangers lurking in military trials which 
were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. 
Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the 
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline 
among troops . . . .”). 
 63. See Al Sharimi v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 162 (4th Cir. 
2016) (holding that “[t]he political question doctrine does not shield from judicial 
review intentional acts by government contractors that were unlawful at the time 
they were committed” when determining whether the Alien Tort Statute may be 
applied to private contractors who orchestrated the Abu Ghraib detainee abuses). 
In Al Sharimi, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided whether the district 
court erred when it dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint because it presented a 
non-justiciable political question. Id. at 151. The plaintiffs were four Iraqi 
nationals who alleged that they were abused while in the custody of the U.S. Army 
at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, Iraq in 2003–04. Id. CACI Premier 
Technology, Inc. (CACI) provided the military with interrogation services at the 
time and were the recipients of this civil suit. Id. The district court made this 
determination of non-justiciability based on three grounds. Id. First, the court 
determined that interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib were under direct control 
of the military. Id. Second, the questioning of sensitive military judgements by 
the district court would be improper. Id. Finally, the district court did note possess 
any judicially manageable standards to resolve the claims. Id. The Circuit Court 
concluded that because the district court does in fact have manageable standards 
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but is only worth discussing for a few moments. This is a tort case 
stemming from the Abu Ghraib detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib 
prison near Baghdad, Iraq in 2003 and 2004.64 In this case, four 
Iraqi nationals alleged that they were abused at the prison while 
being detained;65 they were initially detained in 2003 and were 
eventually released without being charged with a crime.66 They 
filed a civil action against CACI Premier Technology, Inc. which 
“provided contract interrogation services for the military at the 
time of the alleged mistreatment.”67  
This case is relevant because it shows how difficult it is to get 
jurisdiction over private contractors and PMFs, even in civil cases. 
The plaintiffs brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 
alleging “that CACI employees committed acts involving torture 
and war crimes, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The 
plaintiffs also asserted various tort claims under the common law, 
including assault and battery, sexual assault and battery, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”68 While the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals eventually held that the district court 
erred in holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were not justiciable, it 
remains to be seen whether the plaintiffs will successfully apply 
the ATS to their case and win a judgment against a 
well-established PMF.69 
                                                                                                     
with which to adjudicate because it can interpret statutory terms and established 
international norms which are commonly used to interpret Alien Tort Statute 
claims. Id. at 161. The Circuit Court also decided that the political question 
doctrine does not screen intentional, unlawful acts of a government contractor 
from judicial review. Id. at 162. Thus, the Circuit court held that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were justiciable by the district court. Id.  
 64. See id. at 151 (“Suhail Al Shimari, Taha Rashid, Salah Al-Ejaili, and 
Asa’ad Al-Zuba’e (the plaintiffs), four Iraqi nationals, alleged that they were 
abused while detained in the custody of the United States Army at Abu Ghraib 
prison, located near Baghdad, Iraq, in 2003 and 2004.”). 
 65. See id. (discussing the abuse allegations of the four Iraqi nationals which 
are claimed to have been performed by CACI private contractors). 
 66. See id. (“They were detained beginning in the fall of 2003, and ultimately 
were released without being charged with a crime.”).  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (citing the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [hereinafter ATS]). 
 69. See id. at 158–59 (concluding that any unlawful acts of 
the CACI employees are subject to judicial review “to the extent that the 
challenged conduct violated settled international law or the criminal law to which 
the CACI employees were subject at the time the conduct occurred”). 
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C. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)70 
MEJA was enacted in 2000 in order to “establish Federal 
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United 
States by persons employed by or accompanying the United States 
Armed Forces.”71 It gives federal prosecutors jurisdiction in order 
to prosecute those civilians whom are normally barred under the 
UCMJ,72 specifically allowing prosecutors to charge contractors of 
PMFs when they commit crimes abroad while working in tandem 
with or under contract for the United States.73 The relevant 
provision of MEJA at issue in this Note, Section 3261(a), is the 
provision which makes a felony committed abroad able to be 
prosecuted at home in the U.S. This Section states: 
(a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that 
would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for 
more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States— 
(1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces 
outside the United States.74 
This broad language gave federal prosecutors a wide array of laws 
from which to choose when they charged the four Blackwater 
contractors who fired indiscriminately at Iraqi civilians at Nisour 
Square—and this broad language is the Achilles’ heel of MEJA.75 
It allows prosecutors to essentially charge the defendants with 
                                                                                                     
 70. MEJA, supra note 5. 
 71. H.R. Rep. No. 106-778, at 4 (2000). 
 72. See discussion supra Part II.  
 73. See Christopher D. Belen, Reining in Rambo: Prosecuting Crimes 
Committed by American Contractors in Iraq, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 169, 176 
(2008) (“MEJA is the primary statutory vehicle for criminal prosecution of private 
military contractors. When the MEJA was originally passed . . . Congress 
believed it closed an accountability gap . . . . What emerged, however, was a 
well-intended law too ambiguous to apply to those who contracted with non-DoD 
agencies.”). 
 74. MEJA, supra note 5. 
 75. See Achilles’ heel, MARRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online ed.) (last 
visited February 18, 2017, 4:10 pm) (“A fault or weakness that causes or could 
cause someone or something to fail.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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every possible felony action in order to maximize their odds at 
reaching any conviction at all, on any charge.76  
Unfortunately, many of these laws—and their subsequent 
sentences— were not meant to be applied to contractors in a war 
zone. In the case of Slatten, prosecutors charged all four 
defendants with violating Section 924(c) because they used 
machine guns when they committed their crimes.77 But 924(c) was 
enacted to combat violent crimes and drug trafficking in American 
neighborhoods, not regulate those individuals fighting in combat 
zones on behalf of the U.S, as the “Supreme Court has 
described Section 924(c)’s basic purpose as an effort to combat the 
‘dangerous combination’ of ‘drugs and guns.’”78 The majority in 
Slatten further explained that 924(c) was meant to dissuade those 
criminals who set out to commit a felony from also using an 
automatic weapon to facilitate that felony.79 Thus, instead of 
finally achieving justice for the victims’ families after a decade of 
litigation, we are left with more uncertainty after the D.C. Circuit 
Court held that the mandatory minimum sentences issued in 
Slatten violated the defendants’ Eighth Amendment protections 
against cruel and unusual punishment and remanded the case to 
the district court for more litigation.80 
Prior to the enactment of MEJA, the obligation to prosecute 
crimes committed by U.S. civilians fell upon the host nation.81 If 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Belen, supra note 73, at 174 (“MEJA extended federal court 
jurisdiction to include U.S. civilians who commit felonies while employed by or 
accompanying the military overseas.”).  
 77. See United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied sub nom., Slough v. United States, 218 U.S. LEXIS 2836 (U.S., May 2018) 
(“On remand, the government used a new prosecutorial team and convened a new 
grand jury, which returned indictments against the defendants for voluntary 
manslaughter, attempted manslaughter and using and discharging a firearm in 
relation to a crime of violence.” (emphasis added)). 
 78. Id. at 813. 
 79. See id. at 812 (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized Section 924(c) was 
created ‘to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave 
his gun at home.’ Thus, precedent clarifies Section 924(c) applies against those 
who intentionally bring dangerous guns with them to facilitate the commission of 
a crime.” (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998)) (citing 
Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 405 (1980))). 
 80. See id. at 820 (concluding that 924(c) was not meant to apply to warzones 
and that the mandatory 30-year sentences are cruel and unusual).  
 81. See Joeseph R. Perlek, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 
2000: Implications for Contractor Personnel, 169 MIL. L. REV. 92, 101 (2001) 
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the host nation was not willing or not able to exert its jurisdiction 
to prosecute, “then the offense would go unpunished.”82 The intent 
of Congress to use MEJA to fill these jurisdictional gaps is evident 
in its statutory construction, particularly section 3261(b) which 
deals with concurrent jurisdiction: 
No prosecution may be commenced against a person under this 
section if a foreign government, in accordance with jurisdiction 
recognized by the United States, has prosecuted or is 
prosecuting such person for the conduct constituting such 
offense, except upon the approval of the Attorney General or the 
Deputy Attorney General (or person acting in either such 
capacity), which function or approval may not be delegated.83 
This section serves two purposes. First, Congress intended for 
MEJA to be used only in those few cases where an existing scheme 
of criminal law was not an option for addressing crimes committed 
by U.S. civilians overseas.84 Second, while the American notion of 
double jeopardy does not apply to situations where two separate 
sovereigns wish to prosecute a crime, Congress intended to use 
MEJA to prosecute crimes which no other sovereign would 
prosecute.85 MEJA is not meant to pursue duplicate and redundant 
prosecutions.86  
                                                                                                     
(describing how host nations had the sole authority to prosecute many criminal 
offenses committed by civilians accompanying the armed forces).  
 82. Id. at 101–02.  
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(b).  
 84. See Perlek, supra note 81, at 102 (“Where international agreements 
recognized by the United States already provide for foreign criminal jurisdiction, 
and that jurisdiction is exercised, then Congress is content to allow that existing 
scheme of law, namely foreign law, to be applied.”); id. (“In a recently publicized 
case involving . . . American service members in Germany, German law was 
applied, yielding sentences between seven years and eight-and-a-half years for 
the three defendants.”).  
 85. See id. 103 (discussing the roles of the Attorney General and Deputy 
Attorney General in ensuring that the U.S. “will not pursue concurrent or parallel 
prosecutions except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, and with the very 
highest level of authorization”). 
 86. See id. (“Although the American legal doctrine of ‘double jeopardy’ does 
not apply where there are two separate sovereigns (for example, the United States 
and Germany), Congress wants to avoid redundancy.”).  
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D. Immunity for Contractors Prevented the Prosecution of 
Blackwater Contractors Under Iraqi Law 
Charging contractors under Iraqi law is difficult for two 
reasons.87 First, the new Iraqi government is not capable of trying 
cases of this magnitude, especially when many of the contractors 
have more advanced weaponry than the host nation.88 Second, the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) granted immunity to 
contractors, with the successive Iraqi government failing to repeal 
this immunity.89 The legal system in post-Saddam Iraq while the 
CPA was taking root was murky at best.90 The CPA issued Order 
No. 7, which preserved the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 as long as the 
CPA did not issue a conflicting law.91 CPA’s inaugural regulation 
reads: 
Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA or superseded by 
legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq, laws in 
force in Iraq as of April 16, 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq 
insofar as the laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its 
rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with the present 
or any other Regulation or Order by the CPA.92 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Belen, supra note 73, at 187 (discussing the legal challenges that 
arise when attempting to prosecute contractors under Iraqi law).  
 88. See id. at 187 (discussing the legal vacuum in post-Sadam Iraq and the 
complications that arose from that situation); see also PETER W. SINGER, 
CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 93–94 
(2008) (discussing how many PMFs can provide small armies with state-of-the-art 
weaponry to clients who possess a weak military or lack one altogether).  
 89. See Belen, supra note 73, at 175 (discussing the legal immunity that 
foreign contractors received while they were working in Iraq while supporting 
United Stated Department of Defense operations).  
 90. See id. at 188–89 (discussing the confusion that plagued the Iraqi legal 
system after the Coalition Provisional Authority replaced Sadam Hussein as the 
sole source of legal policy and the direct and indirect consequences that followed 
as a result of the CPA’s decisions, regardless of how detailed or improvised they 
were). 
 91. See id. (“Although the CPA further amended the Penal Code’s 
applicability, the Penal Code’s relevant provisions remained in effect at the time 
of the Blackwater incident and, therefore, would form the basis for any criminal 
prosecution in an Iraqi court.”). 
 92. Id. at 188. 
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This Order No. 7 amended the Iraqi Penal Code, which was still in 
force at the time of the Blackwater incident in 2007.93  
The CPA later issued Order No. 17, however, which provided 
immunity for contractors in Iraq, regardless of the condition of the 
Iraqi Penal Code.94 The CPA issued Order No. 17 in June 2004 
under the title “Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
[Multi-National Force]-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in 
Iraq.”95 This Order “granted immunity from legal liability to a wide 
swath of contractors operating in Iraq.”96 This Order specifically 
addressed personnel working to reconstruct Iraq once the U.S. 
military offensive ended.97 This Order was issued pursuant to 
several United Nations Security Council Resolutions.98  
Section 4 of Order 17 fulfilled three goals. First, it described 
the process for registering with a centralized governmental body.99 
Second, it established choice of law.100 Third, and most 
importantly, it granted legal immunity to contractors.101 Section 4 
stated: 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. at 189 (“In June 2004, the CPA released an Order under the 
innocuous title ‘Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, [Multi-National 
Force]-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq.’ Although unnoticed at the 
time, this Order granted immunity from legal liability to a wide swath of 
contractors operating in Iraq.”). 
 94. See id. at 189 (discussing immunity from prosecution under the Iraqi 
criminal law system for foreign contractors in Iraq which included Blackwater 
USA).  
 95. Id. at 189. 
 96. See id. (“The Order specifically sought to ‘clarify the status’ of personnel 
assisting in the reconstruction of Iraq after the end of the U.S. military 
offensive.”). 
 97. See id. (“In light of its purpose to clarify the status of personnel 
associated with the occupation, rebuilding, and transitional period in 
post-Saddam Iraq, the broad definition of persons covered by the Order is 
reasonable.”). 
 98. See id. (“The Order specifically cited United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 1483 (2003), 1511 (2003), and 1546 (2004).”). 
 99. See id. at 190 (“Section 4 of CPA Order 17 accomplishes three primary 
goals: [P]roviding requirements for registration with a centralized governmental 
body, establishing particularized choice of law, and granting partial legal 
immunity to contractors.”). 
 100. See id. (describing one of the goals of Section 4 of CPA Order 17 as 
“establishing particularized choice of law . . . .”).  
 101. See id. (describing one of the goals of Section 4 of CPA Order 17 as 
“granting partial legal immunity to contractors”). 
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Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with 
respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto. Nothing in 
this provision shall prohibit [Multi-National Force] Personnel 
from preventing acts of serious misconduct by Contractors, or 
otherwise temporarily detaining any Contractors who pose a 
risk of injury to themselves or others, pending expeditious 
turnover to the appropriate authorities of the Sending State. In 
all such circumstances, the appropriate senior representative of 
the Contractor’s Sending State in Iraq shall be notified.102 
Contractors in general and the Blackwater defendants specifically 
were not accountable to the Iraqi government for any crime 
committed in Iraq and were only subject to the control of the 
Sending State, unless this immunity was waived.103  
Order 17 was still in force when the Nisur Square incident 
occurred. Section 20 of Order 17 states: 
[T]his Order shall enter into force on the date of 
signature . . . [and] shall remain in force for the duration of the 
mandate authorizing the [Multi-National Force (“MNF”)] under 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546 and any 
subsequent relevant resolutions and shall not terminate until 
the departure of the final element of the MNF from Iraq, unless 
rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having 
the force of law.104 
Order 17 came into force under this provision on June 27, 2004.105 
It would terminate when rescinded or when the final MNF element 
departed Iraq.106 This differs from other CPA Orders which did not 
address the order’s termination.107 This unique termination 
language was inserted to ensure the Iraqi people that contractors 
in Iraq were not being given limitless immunity.108 On the day of 
                                                                                                     
 102. Id. at 190–91. 
 103. See id. at 191 (discussing immunity for private contractors in Iraq, such 
as those contractors working for Blackwater).  
 104. Id. at 194.  
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 194 (“Under this provision, Order 17 became effective June 27, 
2004, and would terminate upon its rescission or the ‘departure of the final 
element of the MNF from Iraq.”). 
 107. See id. (“This provision distinguishes Order 17 from other orders issued 
by the CPA.”). 
 108. See id. at 197 (“This language is unique: no other public notice included 
similar language regarding the limited duration of an order’s effectiveness . . . the 
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the Nisur Square incident, however, this Order authorizing 
immunity was still in effect.109  
On June 28, 2004, power was transferred from the CPA to the 
Iraqi government.110 On that day, CPA Administrator Bremer 
signed Order 100.111 This new Order stated that unless the Iraqi 
government acted, all previous CPA Orders were to remain in 
effect.112 While Order 100 modified or rescinded some previous 
Orders, Order 17 was not changed, as Order 100 “expressly 
provides that Order 17 is unaffected by Order 100.”113 
With prosecution under Iraqi law extremely doubtful, there 
was still a valid argument against applying MEJA to the Nisour 
Square incident. The main argument against applying MEJA was 
that “[t]he fundamental obstacle lies in the necessary legal 
argument that the Blackwater contractors acted while ‘supporting 
the mission’ of the Armed Forces.”114 Prosecution under MEJA 
prior to the 2004 amendment would have been impossible because 
the Blackwater contractors were working for the State 
Department, not the Defense Department.115 However, even after 
2004, it would still need to be proven that the State Department’s 
mission was in fact supporting the larger DoD mission.116  
This is extremely complicated because while contractors may 
not have been fulfilling offensive military missions, they were 
completing jobs that previously been carried out by the military, 
                                                                                                     
language likely was intended to assure the public that the blanket immunity 
granted to contractors would not be limitless in duration.”). 
 109. See id. at 198–99 (“Therefore, Order 17 remained in force beyond the 
CPA dissolution and, according to its terms, is enforceable until rescinded or 
superseded by the Iraqi government which assumed responsibility for all powers 
held by the CPA.”).  
 110. See id. (discussing the transfer of power in Iraq).  
 111. See id. (“On the same day, CPA Administrator Bremer signed Order 100, 
providing for the effective transfer of power from the CPA to the new Iraqi 
government.”).  
 112. See id. (“Order 100 states that all CPA Orders will remain in effect unless 
and until rescinded by the Iraqi government.”).  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 201.  
 115. See id. (discussing the evolution of MEJA to include non-DoD 
contractors). 
 116. See id. (“[T]he expansion of the definition of ‘employed by the Armed 
Forces’ to include non-DoD contractors removes a prohibitive barrier and replaced 
it with a high hurdle.”).  
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especially in Iraq where there is no clear safe zone separate from 
the fighting.117 However, the Blackwater contracts were explicit in 
detailing their diplomatic duties and obligations to protect State 
Department personnel.118  
The argument in favor of applying MEJA in 2007 was context 
specific.119 Iraq was a war zone, and most State Department 
contracts can be assumed to be in support of this larger DoD 
mission.120 In fact, “[p]erhaps the only link between Blackwater’s 
contract and the military mission in Iraq arises from the 
often-lawless nature of the environment.”121 Blackwater 
contractors, like any other person in Iraq, were operating in a grey 
zone, both legally and operationally.122 Blackwater contractors 
protected key personnel in warzones and were subjected to daily 
violence and attacks.123 For every contractor employed in Iraq, a 
US soldier was free to join offensive missions to combat 
insurgents.124 Clearly the Blackwater contractors involved in the 
Nisur Square shooting were in Iraq supporting the DoD mission 
through their work with the State Department.125 Summed up, 
                                                                                                     
 117. See id. at 201–02 (describing how Blackwater contractors performed 
different functions than their military counterparts, such as providing VIP escort 
services for the State Department instead of tracking terrorists or acting as 
military police). 
 118. See id. (“Rather than acting in support of the mission of the military, 
Blackwater’s role was explicitly limited to supporting the mission of the 
diplomatic corps and within that mission Blackwater’s support was limited to 
providing personal protection services.”). 
 119. See id. at 202 (discussing the counter-argument in favor of applying 
MEJA to the Nisour Square incident because Iraq was essentially a giant war 
zone in 2007).  
 120. See id. (discussing the State Department’s role in supporting the DoD in 
Iraq in 2007 when the Nisour Square incident happened).  
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. (“The daily violence and the nature of counter-insurgency conflict 
blurred the traditional lines between military, law enforcement, and the 
defense-oriented protection services provided by contractors like Blackwater.”). 
 123. See id. at 202 (same).  
 124. See id. (“Taking this reasoning one step further, without Blackwater’s 
protective services, American military personnel would have to protect the 
Embassy and diplomatic corps; this alleviation of responsibility is a form of 
‘support’ for the military mission.”). 
 125. See id. at 169 (“The heavily armed Americans were not tourists or 
ordinary criminals; they were employed by Blackwater USA, a State Department 
contractor, and paid to protect the United States Embassy and diplomatic corps 
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“[a]t its essence, therefore, an argument in favor of applicability 
must rest on, first, the heightened violence in Iraq as justification 
for Blackwater’s contract and, second, a link between the military 
mission in Iraq and that heightened violence.”126 
III. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Holds that a Mandatory 
Minimum Sentence for Contractors in War Zones Violates the 
Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment. 
A. Procedural Background 
After the shootings, the State Department held “mandatory 
de-briefing interviews” of Raven 23.127 These interviews proved to 
be a source of contention, as various grand jury witnesses relied on 
these statements to give their testimony.128 The district court 
subsequently “dismissed the case as tainted as to all 
defendants.”129 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit “agreed that the oral and written statements that resulted 
from the de-briefings were compelled, and thus could not be used 
directly or indirectly by the government against the defendants 
who made them.”130 The D.C. Circuit Court, however, remanded 
the case so that the district court could analyze the magnitude of 
the taint in question.131  
Once remanded, a new prosecutorial team was used by the 
government and a new grand jury was convened which “returned 
indictments against the defendants for voluntary manslaughter, 
attempted manslaughter and using and discharging a firearm in 
                                                                                                     
in Baghdad.”). 
 126. Id. at 202.  
 127. United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied 
sub nom., Slough v. United States, 218 U.S. LEXIS 2836 (U.S., May 2018). 
 128. See id. (discussing the reliance of “certain” grand jury witnesses on the 
mandatory de-briefing interviews). 
 129. Id. (citing United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 166 (D.D.C. 
2009; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)).  
 130. Id.  
 131. See id. (“The Court . . . remanded the case for a more individualized 
analysis of the effect of the taint.”) (citing United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544, 
548, 554–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
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relation to a crime of violence.”132 Then, Slatten “moved to dismiss 
the charges against him” because he argued they were 
“time-barred.”133 The D.C. Circuit Court granted this motion by 
writ of mandamus.134 The government, however, then successfully 
obtained an indictment for Slatten which charged him with 
first-degree murder.135 Finally, in mid-2014 all four defendants 
were tried jointly.136 The jury deliberated for seven weeks.137 The 
defendants were found guilty on all but three charges.138 Slatten, 
who was found to have instigated the shootings when he fired the 
first shot, was sentenced to life imprisonment by the district 
court,139 while the district court “sentenced Slough, Liberty and 
Heard to the mandatory term of imprisonment of thirty years for 
their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), plus one day on all of 
the remaining counts.”140 
B. Appellate Decision 
Defendants Slough and Heard were found guilty under 
§ 924(c) for discharging their machine guns and “destructive 
devices” during the Nisur Square attack, while Liberty was found 
guilty for the same offense but without the added “destructive 
device” element.141 They were each sentenced to the mandatory 
minimum of 30 years, plus one day for the remaining voluntary 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. See id. (discussing the Slatten’s successful motion to dismiss and the writ 
of mandamus) (citing In re Slatten, No. 14-3007, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7385 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 18, 2014)). 
 135. See id. (discussing the subsequent indictment of Slatten after the D.C. 
Circuit Court granted his initial motion to dismiss for voluntary manslaughter, 
attempted manslaughter, and using and discharging a firearm in reaction to a 
crime of violence). 
 136. See id. (discussing the eventual joint prosecution of the four defendants 
in the summer of 2014).  
 137. See id. (discussing the jury deliberation).  
 138. See id. (discussing the verdicts reached by the jury which found the 
defendants guilty for all the counts save for three). 
 139. See id. (discussing the district court’s sentencing of Slatten to life in 
prison for first-degree murder). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 811.  
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manslaughter charges and the attempted voluntary manslaughter 
charges.142 They challenged these sentences as “unconstitutionally 
rigid and grossly disproportionate.”143 The D.C. Circuit agreed, 
concluding that “the mandatory 30-year sentence imposed by 
§ 924(c) based solely on the type of weapons Slough, Heard and 
Liberty used during the Nisur Square shooting is grossly 
disproportionate to their culpability for using government-issued 
weapons in a war zone.”144 
To begin its evaluation, the court addressed the 
proportionality of the mandatory minimum sentences.145 The court 
first addressed the ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” as 
stated in the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.146 The 
court further added that a sentence for a crime must “be graduated 
and proportioned to the offense.”147 The court conceded that the 
proportionality principle is narrow and that it concerns only 
“extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the 
crime.”148  
There are two types of Eighth Amendment challenges.149 The 
first challenge addresses sentences as applied to an individual 
defendant “based on all the circumstances in a particular case.”150 
The second challenge is categorical and applies to the nature of the 
                                                                                                     
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 144. Id. (concluding that the sentences violated the Eighth Amendment and 
remanding for resentencing). 
 145. See id. (same). 
 146. Id. (internal quotations omitted). See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010) (ruling that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of a 
life-without-parole sentence on the juvenile offender who committed a 
non-homicide crime). 
 147. Slatten, 865 F.3d at 811 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 59) (internal 
quotations omitted). See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) 
(ruling that while mandatory sentences are cruel, they are not unusual in the 
constitutional sense because they have been used throughout U.S. history). 
 148. Slatten, 865 F.3d at 811 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 149. See id. (“There are two types of Eighth Amendment Challenges to 
sentence: 1) challenges to sentences as applied to an individual defendant based 
on ‘all the circumstances in a particular case’ and 2) categorical challenges to 
sentences imposed based on the nature of the offense or the ‘characteristics of the 
offenders.” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 59–61)). 
 150. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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offense itself and the “characteristics of the offender.”151 The three 
defendants in this case challenged their sentences on both 
methods, claiming that their individual circumstances, as well as 
“all defendants who have discharged their government-issued 
weapons in a war zone,” warranted relief from their sentences.152 
Although the court recognized that the automatic weapons in 
question drastically increased the severity of their crimes, it 
believed that that application of § 924(c) in this case only 
tangentially related to the Congressional intent for enacting the 
statute in the first place.153 Congress cited prior Supreme Court 
rulings to explain that the primary purpose of § 924(c) was to 
combat the violence associated with drug crimes in the United 
States and to deter would-be felons to leave their guns at home.154 
This case differs from the Congressional intent of § 924(c) because 
the defendants did not set out to commit a felony, such as selling 
and trafficking narcotics; they were carrying out their wartime 
duties.155 The court also noted that the severity of the defendants’ 
crimes did not stem from the type of weapons used, but from their 
“hypervigilance” in a crowded area while simultaneously using 
poor judgment in responding to misperceived threats;156 the court 
elaborated that “[t]he tragedy that unfolded shortly after their 
arrival in Nisur Square owed more to panic and poor judgment 
than to any coordinated plan to murder Iraqi civilians.”157 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152. Id.  
 153. See id. at 812 (“Moreover, under normal circumstances, we would be 
‘reluctant to review [Congress’s] legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.’ 
However, we do not believe such deference is owed when a statute’s application 
only tangentially relates to Congress’s purpose for creating the statute in the first 
place.” (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982)) (citing Gonzalez v. 
Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 884–86 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
 154. See id. (“The Supreme Court has recognized Section 924(c) was created 
‘to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal [sic] felony to leave his 
gun at home.’” (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998))).  
 155. See id. at 813 (explaining that Section 924(c) was not intended to apply 
to those whose jobs required them to be armed and dangerous).  
 156. See id. at 813–14 (“While we agree the defendants are responsible for 
their exaggerated response to perceived threats, the crime’s severity and 
Defendant’s culpability flow from the harm caused by their hypervigilance, not 
from the use of weapons which would have been appropriate had they not 
misperceived the threat.”). 
 157. Id.  
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It is easy to understand why prosecutors would charge the 
defendants with violating § 924(c) given that it is “one of the most 
frequently used mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.”158 
Section 924(c) applies to defendants who commit a drug trafficking 
crime or crime of violence, knowingly possessed a firearm, and 
possessed the firearm in furtherance of the underlying crime.159 A 
crime of violence for the purposes of § 924(c) is  
a felony that (a) has, as an element, the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another; or (b) that by its nature involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offense.160 
There is a relatively low bar for charging a defendant with 
violating § 924(c), so when a defendant is charged with over a 
dozen counts of voluntary manslaughter, it is safe to assume 
§ 924(c) will be part of the indictment.161  
However, the court did not believe that this case rose to the 
level of criminality required for § 924(c) to be applied. The court 
discussed the defendants’ job at the time of the Nisur Square 
attack.162 They were not attempting to facilitate a crime, but 
instead were providing diplomatic security for the State 
Department in Iraq, a war zone.163 They did not choose to carry 
                                                                                                     
 158. Thomas A. Clare, Smith v. United States and the Modern Interpretation 
of 18 U.S.C. 924(c): A Proposal to Amend the Federal Armed Offender Statute, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 815 (1994). 
 159. See Darian B. Taylor, What Constitutes “Possession” of Firearm for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1), Providing Penalty for Possession of Firearm 
in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking Crime or Crime of Violence, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 
37, Art. 12 (defining the criteria to charge someone with violating § 924(c)).  
 160. Id.  
 161. See generally United States v. Grajales, No. 13–11224, 2014 WL 2186437 
(11th Cir. May 27, 2014) (ruling that the defendant possessed a firearm in 
furtherance of a crime of violence where the defendant told an informant that 
there were guns “inside the hood,” a gun was hidden in a car, others were armed, 
and the need to be armed was discussed with undercover officers). 
 162. See United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied sub nom., Slough v. United States, 218 U.S. LEXIS 2836 (U.S., May 2018) 
(“None of these concerns are implicated in this case. On the day of the Nisur [sic] 
Square attack, Slough, Heard, and Liberty were providing diplomatic security for 
the Department of State in Iraq.”) 
 163. See id. at 813–14 (explaining the court’s findings on the series of events 
that occurred). The court stated: 
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their weapons but were required to do so.164 In fact, they were 
responding to an explosion near a U.S. diplomat, not haphazardly 
injecting themselves into dangerous situations in which they 
should not be.165 
The court also dismissed the government’s argument that the 
defendants could have used less deadly weapons, such as pistols or 
using the semi-automatic settings on their rifles instead of full 
automatic.166 The court explained that “this argument mistakenly 
applies the ‘20/20 vision of hindsight,’ an approach the Supreme 
Court has explicitly rejected when evaluating a police officer’s use 
of force.”167 The court gave the defendants the benefit of the doubt 
just as they would police officers in the United States, stating “this 
Court applies an analysis that ‘allow[s] for the fact that police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.’”168 
The court evaluated the impact of the defendants’ criminal 
history on the appropriateness of the mandatory minimum 
sentences.169 The court noted that the government has free reign 
to impose harsh sentences on first-time offenders, but that this 
method of rehabilitation is customarily reserved for “hardened 
                                                                                                     
The government argues Slough, Heard and Liberty could have 
used less deadly weapons, such as pistols or the semi-automatic setting 
on their rifles, in response to perceived threats. But this argument 
mistakenly applies the ‘20/20 vision of hindsight,’ an approach the 
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected when evaluating a police officer’s 
use of force. 
Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 164. See id. at 813 (“As part of their jobs, they were required to carry the very 
weapons they have now been sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment for 
using.”). 
 165. See id. (discussing how the contractors responded to an explosion in the 
course of performing their duties and did not interject themselves into danger 
haphazardly without reason or justification). 
 166. See id. at 814 (“The government argues Slough, Heard and Liberty could 
have used less deadly weapons, such as pistols or the semi-automatic setting on 
their rifles, in response to perceived threats.”)  
 167. Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 168. Id. (citing Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).  
 169. See id. (“We also find it highly significant that none of the defendants 
sentenced under Section 924(c) have any prior convictions.”). 
DOGS OF WAR 391 
criminals.”170 Since the defendants had clean records, these 
particular mandatory minimum sentences were not appropriate.171 
In fact, the court addressed the issue of recidivism and the purpose 
of mandatory sentences as a method of preventing repeat crime, 
an issue not present in this case.172 
The court looked at two more factors to determine whether the 
defendants’ sentences were appropriate. First, the court examined 
whether the sentences accurately depicted the three defendants’ 
individual culpability.173 The court determined that these 
sentences failed in this aspect.174 The three defendants were not 
charged with the exact same crimes, so allowing the trial judge to 
examine each defendant independently and give each defendant a 
sentence custom made for that person would better serve justice, 
instead of the “one-size-fits-all” method.175  
Second, the court examined the severity of a thirty-year 
sentence in the context of this case.176 The court acknowledged the 
difference between life in prison with or without parole, and then 
it turned to the severe nature of a thirty-year sentence.177 The 
                                                                                                     
 170. See id. (“Although the government is free to impose harsh, mandatory 
penalties for first-time offenders, a regime of strict liability resulting in draconian 
punishment is usually reserved for hardened criminals.”). 
 171. See id. (discussing the defendants’ lack of criminal records and how the 
district court noted “they were ‘good young men who [had] never been in trouble’” 
and that they had honorably served in the military). 
 172. See id. (discussing how the Supreme Court usually reserves harsh 
sentences for minor violent crimes for cases involving recidivism and holding that 
“the defendants’ clean criminal records weigh against the imposition of a harsh, 
mandatory sentence”). 
 173. See id. at 815 (“Additionally, the imposition of a mandatory 30-year 
sentence through section 924(c) fails to truly account for the culpability of Slough, 
Heard and liberty individually. Because these men were not convicted of the same 
counts, it makes little sense for the sentences to be identical.”). 
 174. See id. (stating that it would make more sense to try each defendant as 
an individual because they were not charged with the same exact crimes). 
 175. See id. (discussing how the sentencing judge was bound by Section 
924(c)’s mandatory minimum sentence, thus precluding him from taking into 
account the differences in offenses of the three defendants and other factors such 
as any diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)). 
 176. See id. (“Turning now to the severity of the sentence, we consider the 
actual severity of the penalty, not the penalty’s name.”). 
 177. See id. (discussing that “the Supreme Court has acknowledged there is 
an important distinction between a life sentence with the possibility of parole and 
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court discussed the fact that the defendants would be forced to 
serve almost the entire sentence, which is drastic for a first 
offense.178 In conclusion, the court stated that 924(c)’s harsh 
mandatory minimum thirty-year sentence in this case was indeed 
the rare instance of a gross disproportionality in sentencing.179  
IV. The D.C. Circuit Ruling in United States v. Slatten Voids 
MEJA as a Reliable Means to Obtain Jurisdiction over 
Contractors in War Zones 
There was already concern about the viability of MEJA as a 
successful tool to prosecute military contractors overseas, in part 
due to its ambiguous and outdated definitions of who was covered 
in the Act.180 MEJA was intended to cover civilians overseas who 
were attached to the military or helping facilitate military 
operations, so there was considerable confusion as to whether 
contractors could be included in the scope of MEJA whose agency 
contracts were not specifically a part of military operations.181 
MEJA specifically covered civilian Department of Defense 
employees and contractors, but it was silent regarding other 
agencies.182 As other agencies, such as the State Department, 
increased their presence in Iraq and their reliance on contractors, 
uncertainty loomed regarding their legal status under MEJA.183 In 
                                                                                                     
a life sentence without the possibility of parole” and how this applies to the 
defendants).  
 178. See id. (explaining that “a 30-year sentence is the harshest mandatory 
sentence the federal criminal law can impose on a first-time offender” besides the 
death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole). 
 179. See id. at 815–16 (concluding that “Slough, Heard and Liberty’s 
mandatory 30-year sentences create the ‘rare case’ that ‘leads to an inference of 
gross disproportionality’” and that their culpability is not on par with the typical 
culpability of defendants convicted under Section 924(c)). 
 180. See Belen, supra note 73, at 174 (“This opinion reflects a belief that even 
the statute intended to prevent this loophole—the MEJA—is not up to the task 
because it suffers from ambiguous and outdated definitions of the persons covered 
by the Act.”).  
 181. See id. (discussing State Department contractors who were overseas but 
not a part of military operations). 
 182. See id. at 179 (“One of the MEJA’s drafters, Glenn Schmitt, later 
explained that Congress ‘simply never considered’ expanding the MEJA’s 
application beyond DoD-affiliated persons.”). 
 183. See id. at 180 (describing the State Department’s concern that their 
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2004, Congress eventually expanded “the definition of ‘employed 
by the Armed Forces’ in 2004, attempting to close this pesky 
jurisdictional gap.”184 But this 2004 amendment was not a perfect 
fix. While the amendment included federal agency employees other 
than DoD, it only included them if their employment was in 
support of a DoD mission.185 
After successfully convicting private contractors for a brutal 
massacre of Iraqi civilians under MEJA, the government is back 
where it started. The three contractors in Slatten will likely still 
serve prison time under the manslaughter convictions, but not for 
the automatic weapons convictions. However, prosecutors are once 
again dealing with an uncertain jurisdictional act when they 
inevitably attempt to prosecute future crimes committed by 
private contractors. Not only is section 924(c) now a questionable 
charge with which to bring against contractors, but charging a 
contractor with any felony that carries a mandatory minimum 
sentence under MEJA is now risky. It would be unwise to bring 
charges under MEJA that have a high chance of being overturned 
on appeal for violating the Eighth Amendment. Prosecutors must 
now guess what those charges might be. 
V. Congress Needs to Amend MEJA to Create a More Certain 
Jurisdictional Framework with Which to Prosecute Private 
Contractors Overseas 
Congress created MEJA as a catch-all jurisdictional act, and 
that is its underlying problem.186 Congress needs to spend the 
appropriate amount of time necessary to diligently create a 
workable jurisdictional act to guarantee that Americans abroad 
will be punished for their felonious activity. Congress should create 
different variations of MEJA, such as one for contractors who are 
                                                                                                     
thousands of employees abroad would not be liable under MEJA for any crimes 
committed overseas and proposing to expand MEJA).  
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 181–82 (discussing the details of the 2004 amendment). 
 186. See id. 176 (“MEJA is the primary statutory vehicle for criminal 
prosecution of [PMFs] . . . . Congress believed it closed an accountability gap, 
authorizing prosecution of Americans who commit serious crimes while overseas. 
What emerged . . . was a well-intended law too ambiguous to apply to those who 
contracted with non-DoD agencies.”).  
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directly supporting military and DoD missions abroad, and one for 
other Americans who are not directly supporting DoD missions, 
such as spouses on American bases or contractors who commit 
routine felonies while not in the line of duty.187 Congress needs to 
account for the middle ground between civilian and military actors 
in which private contractors in conflicts zones occupy.  
A. Congress Needs to Amend MEJA to Account for the Varied 
Roles that PMFs Fill 
This distinction requires Congress to engage with security 
experts in order to avoid the perilous temptation to characterize 
all civilians abroad in bimodal terms as either supporting DoD 
operations or not. This is especially crucial when addressing 
civilians who are employed as private contractors as the missions 
executed by these contractors fall on a spectrum ranging from 
base-support operations to actual enemy engagement.188 This 
spectrum is better known as the “Tip of the Spear” typology.189 
According to this typology,  
[U]nits within the armed forces are distinguished by their 
closeness to the actual fighting (the “front line”) that result in 
implications in their training levels, unit prestige, roles in the 
battle field, directness of impact, and so on. For example, an 
individual serving in a front-line infantry unit (that is, the “tip”) 
possesses completely different training experiences and even 
career prospects than one serving in a command or a logistics 
support team.190 
Organizations sorted along this Tip of the Spear typology are 
“broke[n] down into three broad types of units linked to their 
location in the battle space.”191 These units are characterized as 
those that operate “in the general theater, those in the theater of 
                                                                                                     
 187. See discussion supra Part II. (discussing the various roles civilians play 
while overseas and the difficulties that has created for prosecution teams when 
attempting to gain jurisdiction). 
 188. See Singer, supra note 13, at 91 (“In the military context, the best way to 
structure the industry is by the range of services and level of force that a firm is 
able to offer the industry.”). 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. 
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war, and those in the actual area of operations, that is, the tactical 
battlefield.”192 
PMFs also fall along various points of the Tip of the Spear 
typology just as their military colleagues do. The PMF industry is 
divided into “three broad sectors: Military Provider Firms, Military 
Consultant Firms, and Military Support Firms.”193 While many 
firms fall neatly into one category,194 this is not always the case as 
“similar to other industries and equivalent military functions, 
other firms lie at the borders or offer a range of services within 
various sectors.”195 More and more firms cross sectors as the 
industry in general grows and, as such, more and more firms are 
consolidating globally.196 
Examples of typical Military Provider Firms are Executive 
Outcomes and Sandline International, “having run active combat 
operations in Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, 
and elsewhere.”197 Executive Outcomes is a model firm in this 
category as it easily flexed its military might in 
counterinsurgencies.198 In Sierra Leone alone, Executive Outcomes 
“deployed a battalion-sized unit on the ground, supplemented by 
artillery, transport and combat helicopters, fixed wing combat and 
                                                                                                     
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. See id. at 92 (“The proviso of any such typology, however, is that it is a 
conceptual framework rather than a fixed definition of each and every firm. Some 
firms are clearly placed within one sector.”). 
 195. Id. Academi, the PMF that succeeded Blackwater, offers various services 
including client-based training, scenario-based training, supply chain logistics, 
construction, life support, unmanned aerial systems, and complex program 
management. See Managed Support Services, ACADEMI, 
https://www.academi.com/pages/managed-support-services (last visited Sept. 28, 
2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
Additionally, the parent company of Academi, Constellis, also owns the PMFs 
Triple Canopy, Olive Group, Edinburgh International, Strategic Social, AMK9, 
and OMNIPLEX, solidifying it as a player across multiple sectors within the 
industry. See About Us, ACADEMI, https://www.academi.com/pages/about-us (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 196. See Singer, supra note 13, at 92 (“Moreover, with ongoing global 
consolidation into ever larger PMFs, there is a potential growth in the numbers 
of these firms, such as Armorgroup, that cross sectors.”). 
 197. Id. at 93. 
 198. See id. (discussing the military capabilities of Executive Outcomes and 
similar PMFs in frontline combat operations). 
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transport aircraft, a transport ship, and all types of ancillary 
specialists (such as first aid and civil affairs).”199 
The middle of the Tip of the Spear typology is occupied by the 
Military Consulting Firms.200 These PMFs primarily “provide 
advisory and training services integral to the operation and 
restructuring of a client’s armed forces . . . .”201 These firms “offer 
strategic, operational, and/or organizational analysis” while also 
“engag[ing] with the client at all levels, except at what 
businessmen would describe as ‘customer contact.’”202 This means 
that they do not engage the enemy on the battlefield, but they 
provide the knowledge and training necessary for the client to 
successfully wage a military campaign.203 The civilian counterpart 
to this type of firm is the “management consultant.”204  
The final category of PMF is the Military Support Firm which 
“provide[s] supplementary military services” encompassing 
“nonlethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, 
technical support, supply, and transportation.”205 As is the case 
with the civilian supply-chain management industry, “the benefit 
of this type of military outsourcing is that these firms specialize in 
secondary tasks not part of the overall core mission of the client.”206 
Thus, these PMFs can “build capabilities and efficiencies” which 
are unsustainable by the client.207 This frees the military of the 
client to focus the bulk of its resources on the actual fighting.208 
Including Military Support Firms in the general conversation 
about PMF regulation is critical because they are often overlooked, 
yet they are operating in the same legal uncertainty as other PMFs 
                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 93–94. 
 200. See id. at 95 (discussing the various roles occupied by Military 
Consulting Firms and how they are just as important as those firms who 
primarily occupy the battlefield). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. See id. (explaining that “they do not operate on the battlefield itself” but 
provide the client with the capabilities necessary to ‘re-engineer’ the local force 
which will “bear the final risks on the battlefield”). 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 97. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.  
 208. See id. (discussing the benefits of contracting support tasks to PMFs 
which allow the client military to focus solely on fighting).  
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who interact with insurgents and are just as liable to commit 
crimes overseas, especially while on military bases.209  
B. Congress Should Reduce or Eliminate the Application of 924(c) 
to Private Contractors Supporting DoD Missions 
Not everyone agrees that applying mandatory minimum 
sentences are de facto unconstitutional when used in a warzone 
context, as the dissenting opinion of Judge Rogers in Slatten 
illustrates.210 As Judge Rogers noted, the Supreme Court has held 
that “nothing in Section 924(c) prevents a district court from, as 
here, mitigating the harshness of a mandatory thirty-year 
minimum by imposing a one-day sentence for the predicate 
convictions.”211 The defendants were facing over 100 years in 
prison each—over 200 years for one defendant—due to the severity 
of their crimes, so while the D.C. Circuit has barred the use of 
mandatory minimum sentences in this context, it remains to be 
seen whether other circuit courts will agree or, for that matter, if 
the Supreme Court will weigh in on this issue.212 
But operating under the assumption that the majority’s 
decision will remain the law of the land for the near future, 
Congress should enact legislation to restrict the ability of 
prosecutors to use 924(c) as a charging option when prosecuting 
PMFs who are supporting DoD missions as its application has 
already been ruled unconstitutional. This is especially important 
when prosecuting private contractors who fill the roles of military 
providers or military consultants. These contractors are more 
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likely to be required to carry firearms as a part of their day-to-day 
jobs, just as the defendants in Slatten were required. These 
contractors are far more likely than other civilians to find 
themselves in the position of the defendants in Slatten, increasing 
the likelihood that Eighth Amendment issues and violations will 
occur as their cases progress.  
In contrast, civilians in combat theaters who are not directly 
supporting DoD operations, such as military spouses or contractors 
attached to Military Support Firms, are less likely to possess 
firearms in the course of their jobs, thus decreasing the likelihood 
that they would they would find themselves in the same position 
as the Slatten defendants. For these civilians, restricting the 
application of 924(c) is not as imperative, but should be carefully 
studied.  
C. Congress Should Coordinate PMF Regulation with the 
International Community 
Congress should also coordinate with international 
organizations in an effort to standardize a framework for holding 
contractors accountable for war crimes. The U.S. participated in 
the creation of the Montreux Document, which is the product of a 
“joint initiative of the Swiss government and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).”213 This initiative sets out best 
practices for countries to follow when they contract with PMFs and 
operates as an “intergovernmental statement clearly [that] clearly 
articulates the most pertinent international legal obligations with 
regard to [Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs)] and 
debunks the prevailing misconception that private contractors 
operate in a legal vacuum.”214 
However, this initiative is not legally binding and “does not 
affect existing obligations of States under customary international 
law or under international agreements to which they are 
parties.”215 Instead, this initiative “recalls existing legal 
                                                                                                     
 213. ICRC, The Montreux Document, ICRC 5 (Aug. 2009), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. at 9. 
DOGS OF WAR 399 
obligations of States and PMSCs and their personnel, and provides 
States with good practices to promote compliance with 
international humanitarian law and human rights law during 
armed conflict.”216 While this may have signaled a willingness to 
establish an international legal framework under which PMFs 
could operate a decade ago, more substantial agreements must be 
crafted today, especially agreements which carry with them legally 
binding obligations.  
One entity working to lay the international legal foundations 
for PMF regulations is the United Nations Working Group on the 
use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-determination 
(UNWG).217 In fact, the Slatten case has been referred to as “an 
‘excellent case in point’ for the need for more international 
regulation of the private security industry, perhaps through an 
international treaty that the U.S. government has opposed.”218  
In a recent report, the UNWG described its activities as 
focusing “extensively on, inter alia, the need for robust regulation 
of private military and security companies, with particular 
emphasis on ensuring accountability for human rights violations 
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committed by company personnel.”219 That report illustrates just 
how massive and complex the private contracting industry is, as 
this report from UN working group on mercenaries focused not on 
PMFs or combat operations, but the increasing privatization of 
prisons around the world.220 Particularly, much of the report 
focused on “the situation in the United States, given the high rate 
of incarceration and the tremendous growth of private contractors 
on the prison industry in that country in the past 30 years.”221 
According to the UNWG report, the U.S. private prison industry is 
dominated by just three companies: The Corrections Corporations 
of America, now known as CoreCivic; the Geo Group; and 
Management and Training Corporation.222 This echoes the 
domination of the PMF industry by a few massive firms. This also 
highlights the speed with which traditionally public domains are 
being privatized around the world and how difficult it is for 
legislation to keep pace. 
VI. Conclusion 
The U.S. is not abandoning the use of private contractors to 
supplement or fully replace its military any time soon, so it is 
imperative that Congress not only creates a working jurisdictional 
framework with which to prosecute its own contractors abroad, but 
one that helps standardize the legal framework internationally so 
that international law catches up with twenty-first century 
warfare.  
Private contractors in warfare have been reliable as force 
multipliers around the world for decades.223 They may be efficient 
ad hoc alternatives to expanding State militaries, but the legal 
framework with which to regulate these contractors has either 
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been unreliable or plainly nonexistent. Private contractors 
continue to frustrate lawmakers and human rights activists alike. 
MEJA seemed to finally offer U.S. prosecutors a jurisdictional tool 
with which to prosecute contractors who would otherwise not be 
punished for their crimes committed abroad.  
MEJA has worked in some cases, but U.S. v. Slatten 
demonstrates that there is much room for improvement. MEJA has 
been used successfully to prosecute individuals acting outside of a 
DoD-supporting role. MEJA was successfully used to prosecute the 
Blackwater contractors who committed the 2007 Nisur Square 
massacre, but the D.C. Circuit has created doubt regarding 
MEJA’s long-term reliability. In holding that section 924(c)’s 
mandatory minimum sentence provision violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment, 
prosecutors are left to wonder if other circuits will reach this 
conclusion. Additionally, it remains to be seen whether other 
mandatory minimum sentence provisions will also violate the 
Eighth Amendment when applied to private contractors who are 
working in support of DoD missions in conflict zones.  
The easiest way for Congress to address the consequences of 
Slatten is to address the use of 924(c) under MEJA specifically and 
limit its application to private contractors or eliminate its use 
altogether. This would likely take the least amount of time and 
effort and would be the least controversial remedy. This solution, 
however, is only one small step towards properly regulating PMFs 
both by the U.S. and the international community. Congress needs 
to treat PMF contractors differently than other civilians abroad 
and should differentiate between contractors operating in direct 
support of DoD operations and those indirectly supporting from the 
rear.  
Instead of waiting for private contractors to commit crimes 
abroad and having prosecutors test the limits of MEJA through 
trial and error, Congress should be proactive and amend MEJA by 
addressing the concerns raised by the D.C. Circuit in United States 
v. Slatten. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq themselves 
demonstrate, ad hoc solutions and knee-jerk reactions are doomed 
to fail in the long run. United States v. Slatten and MEJA show 
that this shortsightedness can have the same disastrous effect in 
the courtroom as it does on the battlefield.  
